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COMMERCIAL BANKS, TRUST DEPARTMENTS, AND
CONCENTRATION OF POWER: A LEGACY OF GLASS-STEAGALL
Donald E. FARRAR *
1. Introduction
There is a bit of the populist in most of us and considerable evidence that
our propensities in this direction have been passed along from generation to
generation since the early days of the republic. Andrew Jackson's campaign
against the Second Bank of the United States is only one such early example
[1]. The Sherman Act is another and a relatively recent manifestation of what
appears to be a persistent theme in U.S. history, that is, an aversion to the
emergence anywhere in our society of a concentration in private hands of
political or economic power.
Although latent for the most part during periods of economic growth and
prosperity, the public's suspicion of, and debate concerning, the power of big
banks, money trusts, big business, big labor, and big oil tends to re-ermerge
during periods of economic stress. At such times, bigness is labeled as a
proximate cause for whatever present or recent past difficulties are perceived.
Thus, it is not surprising that the landmark study by Berle and Means in 1932
[2] and the later multi-volume product of the Temporary National Economic
Committee in 1940 [3] attracted so much attention to the problems they
addressed.
During the 1930s interest in the suspected emergence of concentrations of
economic power centered on non-financial corporations. Berle and Means
considered the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) to
epitomize the alarming power of the large publicly-held corporation of that
time. In their words:
With assets of almost five billions of dollars and with 454,000 employees, and stockholders to the
number of 567,697 [AT&T) may indeed be called an economic empire - an empire bounded by no
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geographical limits, but held together by centralized control. One hundred companies of this size
would control the whole of American wealth; would employ all of the gainfully employed; and if
there were no duplication of stockholders, would be owned by practically every family in the
country [4].
The authors were quick to point out that size alone was not necessarily
dangerous. Their concern was that size combined with public ownership
effectively separated ownership from control of corporate assets at a time when
the publicly-held corporation was emerging as the dominant economic unit,
thus leaving the public increasingly dependent upon the performance of
self-perpetuating bodies of corporate managers who, in turn, were effectively
answerable to no one.
Berle and Means accurately perceived that the phenomenal growth of the
large publicly-held corporation had not yet attained its zenith. Even they,
however, might have been hesitant to forecast the extent to which such
companies, and especially the largest among them, would grow as a fraction of
the overall national economy. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) re-
ported in 1979 that 11,000 of the roughly 2,000,000 corporations in the United
States today have sufficiently wide ownership to be considered publicly-held;
3,700 have their shares listed or traded on stock exchanges; and 1,549 are
traded on the NYSE [5]. At the end of 1975, the most recent year for which
such figures are available, NYSE-listed firms accounted for an estimated 42%
of aggregate corporate assets, 44% of aggregate corporate revenues, and 79% of
aggregate corporate income [6]. NYSE-listed firms' share of aggregate corpo-
rate net income has ranged during the most recent decade for which figures are
available from a low of 70% in 1967 to a high of 96% in 1971 [7]. Over the past
two decades NYSE-listed companies have accounted for 65-81% of the market
value of all domestic corporations, with the percentage fluctuating (generally
inversely) with changes in the level of stock prices [8].
Comparing measures in the preceding quotation from Berle and Means
regarding AT&T's size as a fraction of the U.S. economy in 1932 with similar
measures in table 1 of AT&T's present size and that of the other large firms
enumerated there, it appears that the largest non-financial corporations today
are substantially larger, from two to four times larger as fractions of the overall
economy, then they were half a century ago. The public would appear to be
more rather than less dependent today than when Berle and Means first wrote
on the performance of a relatively small number of very large corporations and
their managements.
It is curious, therefore, that in an interview for Dun's Review more than a
decade ago, Adolf Berle, then 73, expressed concern not for the increased size
and power of non-financiaI corporations and their managers, but rather for
"the emergence of a new concentrated power countervailing that of corporate
managements [in the hands of institutional investors]" [9]. Berle expressed
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special concern about the size and apparently continuing growth of commer-
cial bank trust departments as holders (and voters) of corporate shares. In his
words:
In recent years, stock has become more and more concentrated in the hands of institutional
investors. Among the most powerful are the trust departments of the big banks.... [Albout fifteen
or twenty of the big banks through their trust departments could today mobilize voting control of a
very large precentage of American industry.
... The current estimate - it frightens me - is that by 1970 institutional investors will hold one-third
of the stock of corporations listed on the New York Stock Exchange. That adds up to working
control [10].
Berle concluded that size limitations on institutional investors in general
and restrictions on the expansion of commercial banks and bank holding
companies into other lines of business should be considered, to prevent the
emergence of a new power elite from among such institutions [11].
What are the facts regarding the size and growth during recent decades of
institutional investors in general, and commercial bank trust departments in
particular, as investors in corporate shares, as voters of those shares and,
through these and other business relationships with non-financial corporations,
as potential successors to the power of managers of non-financial corpora-
tions? To what extent is there a basis in fact for Berle's concerns in 1968, as
distinct from his and Means' concerns in 1932? And, to what extent may
regulatory policies which trace their origin to legislation such as the Banking
Acts of 1933 and 1935, the Glass-Steagall Acts, have contributed to the
factual bases for these concerns?
These are the questions addressed below.
2. Institutional holdings of corporate stock
Berle's assessment that institutional holdings of corporate stock already
were large by 1968 and growing, both absolutely and as a fraction of total
stock outstanding, was correct, as was his assessment that bank trust depart-
ments were pre-eminent among institutional holders of corporate shares [12].
Even his quantitative estimate, that by 1970 institutional investors would hold
one-third of all NYSE-listed stock, was surprisingly close to the mark given the
sparse information then available regarding the magnitude of several im-
portant types of institutional stockholdings. A summary of holdings by major
classes of institutional and other investors over the decade from 1969 to 1978 is
contained in table 2. Here we see that institutional holdings of corporate stock
amounted to approximately $296 billion, or 34.2% of all stock outstanding as
of year-end 1969, of which bank trust departments held $186 billion or 63% of
the institutional total [13].
240
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From year-end 1969 to year-end 1978, institutional stockholdings continued
to grow, during good markets and bad, to more than $450 billion, representing
approximately 43.4% of the market value of all common and preferred stock
outstanding. This growth, of course, has not been uniform across institutional
types. Bank holdings have increased somewhat more rapidly than those of
other major institutions; investment company stockholdings declined over the
decade, while holdings of life insurance companies increased at more than
twice the average annual rate of growth of institutions as a group. Direct
stockholdings of individuals remained more or less constant in absolute value
over the decade, while their relative share of total stock outstanding declined.
The first element underlying Berle's concern over the possible emergence in
financial institutions of a new concentration of economic power, then, appears
to have a credible basis in fact. Institutional investors as a group have indeed
become substantial owners of corporate stock during the past half century, and
their growth appears to be continuing [14].
A substantial leap is required, however, to bridge the gap between a finding
that institutional investors are important holders (and traders and voters) of
corporate stock and a conclusion that such institutions are in a controlling
position over a significant portion of American industry. It does not follow
from a finding alone that institutional investors hold one-third of the aggregate
market value of all corporate stock that any relatively small collection of
institutions is in a position to control any, let alone many, large U.S. corpora-
tions. Some additional findings (that institutional stockholdings are highly
concentrated in a relatively small number of large institutions, that institu-
tional portfolios are concentrated in the shares of relatively few large compa-
nies, or that other business relationships confer on institutions other sources of
influence over non-financial corporate managements) are required to sustain
such a conclusion [15].
3. Concentration of institutional stockholdings
One of the more interesting findings of the Securities and Exchange
Commission's (SEC) 1971 Institutional Investor Study was that certain of the
larger classes of institutional investors in corporate stock are rather highly
concentrated. By 1969 the ten largest bank trust departments administered
37% of all trust department assets, the twenty largest administered 51% and the
fifty largest 70% [16]. To place these numbers in perspective, the ten largest
bank trust departments together held approximately $68.7 billion in corporate
stock as of year-end 1969, or about 8% of the market value of all stock
outstanding at the time [17].
Investment advisers are the second largest institutional holders of corporate
stock. In addition to managing the funds of investment companies, for which
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D.E. Farrar / Commercial banks and power
such firms are well known, investment advisers also manage substantial pools
of personal advisory accounts, employee benefit accounts, and the funds of
educational endowments, foundations, and even certain insurance accounts.
While mutual funds under investment adviser supervision held approximately
$51 billion in stock in 1969, total accounts managed by such firms contained
more than $95 billion in stock at the end of that year [18]. Here, too, assets
under management are relatively concentrated. The five largest investment
advisers managed 22.5% of all stockholdings held by this group during 1969;
the ten largest managed 36%; the twenty-five largest nearly 60%; and the fifty
largest almost 75% [19]. It follows that the ten largest investment advisers
managed approximately $34.6 billion in common stock portfolios during 1969,
or 4% of the market value of all stock outstanding [20].
While total stockholdings of life insurance companies were smaller than
those of either banks or investment advisers, they were growing more rapidly
and were far more concentrated in 1969 than was the case for any other
institutional type. During that year the single largest life insurance company
held more than 25% of all the stock-oriented, separate account assets in its
industry. The three largest life insurance companies held better than 50% of all
such assets, while the seven largest held more than 75% [21]. Together these
firms held a little more than $10 billion in corporate stock, or approximately
1% of all stock outstanding. If these seven largest life insurers retained their
share of total industry stockholdings through 1978, those holdings would have
exceeded $27 billion, or 2.6%, of all corporate stock outstanding [22].
Similar degrees of concentration apparently exist among other types of
institutional investors as well. The twenty-five largest property-liability in-
surance companies, for example, held approximately $11.2 billion in corporate
stock, or 1.2% of total stock outstanding, at year-end 1969 [23]. The lesser
amount of aggregate stockholdings of property-liability insurance companies
and other institutional types, however, reduce their significance for the purpose
at hand.
4. Concentration within institutional stock portfolios
Wall Street folklore has held for some time that institutional stockholdings
tend to be concentrated in the shares of a relatively few "top tier" corpora-
tions. Until the early 1970s, however, this presumption does not appear to have
been based on a very substantial body of factual data.
For example, a NYSE survey of institutional holdings of NYSE-listed
securities at year-end 1962 found that five stocks accounted for 14.5% and
fifty-one stocks accounted for 41.4% of the market value of all listed stocks
held by the surveyed institutions [24]. As table I indicates, however, these
percentages are almost identical to the fractions of total market value of
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NYSE-listed stocks accounted for by the five largest and the fifty largest
NYSE-listed corporations, respectively, during 1978 [25]. If the largest institu-
tional holdings are concentrated in the largest NYSE-listed corporations only
to this extent, one could conclude that institutional portfolios are not con-
centrated to a greater extent than are the portfolios of individual direct
investors or the overall shareowner population.
The Wharton School reported in 1962 that, although the bulk of investment
company stockholdings over the period 1952-58 were in the shares of thirty of
the largest NYSE-listed companies, fund portfolios actually were less con-
centrated in those shares than was the market as a whole [26].
A similar study by the SEC four years later found essentially the same facts
regarding the concentration of investment company portfolio holdings, i.e. that
investment company portfolios, although heavily invested in the shares of
larger companies, were not more concentrated in those shares than was the
market as a whole [271. The SEC, nevertheless, expressed some concern at the
size of the holdings and concluded that, if other institutional investors followed
similar investment practices, the market for certain large companies and even
industries (such as the airline industry) might be virtually dominated by the
investment decisions of relatively few managers of institutional portfolios [28].
All of these studies were poorly designed to assess the extent to which
institutional portfolios are concentrated and the likelihood that one, two, or a
few such institutions might in fact be in a position to control one or more large
American corporations. A more comprehensive and carefully designed analysis
of institutional portfolio holdings during 1969, which was conducted as part of
the SEC's InstitutionalInvestor Study, was reported by Rosenberg in 1974 [29].
Rosenberg's analysis was based on stockholdings of the fifty largest bank trust
departments, seventy-one largest investment advisers, twenty-six largest life
insurance companies, twenty-five largest property-liability insurance compa-
nies, and forty-one largest self-administered university endowments, founda-
tions, and employee benefit funds in approximately 800 publicly-held corpora-
tions. The stock portfolios of institutions covered by his survey accounted for
more than 70% of the stock held by all financial institutions on the survey date
and for similarly large fractions of the stock held by each included institutional
type.
Most of those analyses were based on holdings of a list of nearly 800 stocks,
including 562 NYSE or American Stock Exchange (Amex)-listed securities and
231 stocks traded nationally over-the-counter (OTC). The sample includes the
twenty-seven largest NYSE-listed securities, which accounted for 35% of the
market value of all NYSE-listed stocks at the time [30].
Rosenberg's study begins with the construction of an index of concentration
for each security, defined as "the ratio of the holdings in a firm to total
portfolio holdings (portfolio ratio) divided by the ratio of the market value of
the firm to the market value of all firms (market ratio)" [31]. As an illustration,
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if holdings by institutions in a particular company's stock amount in the
aggregate to 5% of the value of their combined stock portfolios. while the
market value of the company's shares similarly amounts to 5% of the market
value of all stock outstanding, the company's concentration ratio would be 1.0.
The major thrust of Rosenberg's findings is that for most large firms his
concentration index, as defined above, is greater than 1.0, while for randomly
selected and smaller firms it is equal to or less than 1.0, and the differences are
striking. There is no doubt from his analysis that institutional portfolio
holdings, for all types of institutions, are concentrated in the shares of a
relatively few large companies, while individual direct investors tend to hold
larger than market value proportions of their portfolios in the stock of smaller
companies [32].
The extent of concentration within institutional portfolios is further demon-
strated by observing the surprisingly large fraction of total portfolio value
which is invested in the single largest stockholding and by the surprisingly
small number of stocks which account for half the market value of all
stockholdings in a typical institutional portfolio. Table3, which summarizes
such values for the securities underlying Rosenberg's study, shows that the
largest position in a typical large bank trust department portfolio accounts for
19.5% of the market value of the entire trust department's holdings of sample
stocks and that only eight stocks account for half the market value of sample
stocks in the typical bank portfolio. Comparable figures for investment ad-
visers show that 13.8% of the entire portfolio of sample stocks is invested in the
single largest holding and ten stocks account for half the market value of all
such stocks in the portfolio.
Review of holdings by other institutional types reveals that such degrees of
concentration within portfolios are not unique to banks and investment
advisers, but appear to be characteristic of institutions in general [33].
To be sure, financial institutions may hold large numbers of securities in
their common stock portfolios. As shown in the right-hand column of table 3,
the typical large bank trust department covered by Rosenberg's survey held
244 sample stocks; the typical investment adviser held nearly 100; and the
typical property-liability insurance company averaged forty-eight. As evi-
denced above and elsewhere in table 3, however, most of these holdings are
relatively small, and the great bulk of most of such portfolios tends to be
invested in the shares of relatively few, large companies.
IBM, for example, appears among the eight companies comprising, on
average, the top half of sample stockholdings of forty-eight of the fifty largest
bank trust departments. General Motors is included among the stocks compris-
ing the top half of the holdings of forty-two of the fifty banks; Exxon is
included in thirty-four and Eastman Kodak in thirty-nine [34]. The degree of
commonality in names of the companies in which institutional portfolio
holdings are concentrated is striking, and they are, of course, the largest
companies in the United States.
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Given the extent of concentration in large, institutional portfolios, rela-
tively few institutions hold among themselves fairly sizeable fractions of the
stock outstanding for a great many U.S. companies. Assuming that five
institutions are a small enough group to coordinate their views and actions on
particular issues facing a company and that 5% of a company's shares is
sufficiently large to assure the holders some degree of influence over important
issues facing a company, then nine out of ten U.S. corporations having $1
billion or more in market value of equity would appear to be subject to at least
some such influence. Specifically, forty-eight of the fifty-five U.S. corporations
with equity values in excess of $1 billion in 1969 had five or fewer institutional
shareholders which held in the aggregate 5% of the corporation's shares;
two-thirds of such corporations had five or fewer institutional shareholders
which held in the aggregate 10% of outstanding stock; and 16% had five or
fewer institutional shareholders which held an aggregate of 20% of their shares
[351.
As corporations become smaller, these fractions decline, irregularly at first,
then quite rapidly. Below $250 million in market value, one finds relatively
infrequent incidence of concentrated institutional holdings. Among companies
whose market values were less than $10 million in 1969, for example, only
one-quarter had five institutional stockholders with aggregate holdings of even
5% of the company's shares [36].
As all ten of the largest institutional holders of common stock are bank trust
departments, these conclusions would not be affected to any important degree
by substituting the word "bank" for "institution" in the paragraphs im-
mediately above.
5. Multiple business relationships
Institutional holdings, by themselves, cannot describe fully the direction or
extent of power relationships between the parties. Such a description must also
make reference to the myriad of business and other relationships which exist.
A more comprehensive description of business and other relationships
between 161 of the largest financial institutions and 288 sample companies was
attempted by the SEC's Institutional Investor Study. The set of institutions is
by now familiar; it consists of forty-nine of the fifty largest banks, sixty-nine of
the seventy-one largest investment advisers, twenty-one of the largest
property-liability insurance companies, and twenty-two of the largest life
insurance companies. The 288-company sample of non-financial corporations
contained the twenty-seven largest NYSE-listed companies; 154 randomly
selected NYSE-listed, Amex-listed and OTC companies; and a judgment
sample of 107 companies [37].
Each of the included institutions, of course, is a potential stockholder for
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each company. In addition, each also is a potential creditor; each bank,
investment adviser, and life insurance company is a potential employee benefit
plan manager; each company may hold deposits in any bank; and each
company and institution could have a joint personnel relationship through a
common officer and/or director. One would expect such business and person-
nel relationships to involve more frequently the largest institutions and to exist
more frequently between companies and institutions headquartered in the
same geographic area.
Accordingly, data were collected on each of the enumerated business and
personnel relationships and on company and institution size and geographic
proximity for each of the 46,368 possible institution/company pairs [38].
Business and personnel relationships are the variables of interest; data were
collected on company and institution size and on geographic proximity only to
control for these sources of association between the business and other
relationships.
Many of the observations, of course, are between institutions and compa-
nies which have no common business or personnnel relationships. Indeed, only
10,982, or about one-fourth, of the possible observations are between compa-
nies and institutions which "know" one another in at least one of the ways
enumerated above. After eliminating null observations from the sample, the
frequencies of business and personnel relationships between sample institu-
tions and companies which do "know" one another are as tabulated in table 4.
From table 4 it appears that banks, in part because of their size and in part
because of the broad range of their services, tend to have far more contacts
with sample companies than do institutions of other types. The average bank
represented in table4, for example, had business relationships with 196 sep-
arate sample companies, of which seventy-two, or a little over one-third,
involved duplicate or multiple relationships with a company known in at least
one other way. A typical investment adviser, by contrast, had relationships
with only forty-three of the 288 sample companies, almost all of which were as
a stockholder. Property-liability insurance companies had, on average, thirty-six
relationships with such companies; life insurance companies had an average of
sixty, of which twenty-seven were as stockholder and twenty-three were as
creditor.
There is nothing necessarily undesirable about the existence of multiple
business relationships between institutions and corporations, as long as each
relationship is evaluated separately and entered into willingly by both parties
and as long as conflicts inherent in certain combinations of the relationships
are handled properly.
Statistical analyses, by identifying the existence of multiple relationships of
certain types, can identify potential conflicts [39], but not the manner in which
they are resolved. Similarly, analyses of statistical independence between
multiple business relationships, if confirmed, can indicate the apparent absence
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol4/iss3/2
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Table 4
Number of relationships between institutions and sample companies, a
Institutions Relationship
(number in parentheses)
Stock Creditor Depository Employee Personnel
holding benefit
plan
manager
Banks (49) 5,324 1,581 2.133 285 297
Investment advisers
(69) 2.748 67 0 45 91
Property-liability
insurance companies
(21) 640 43 0 0 69
Life insurance
companies (22) 598 506 0 96 113
a 161 of the largest institutions and 288 sample companies.
Source: 5 Sec. and Exchange Comm'n, Institutional Investor Study Report. H.R. Doc. No. 64. pt.
5, 92d Cong.. 1st Sess. 2735. 2741 (1971).
of anti-competitive problems. Should strong, positive correlations be found
between the relationships, of course, they would not provide prima facie
evidence of tying relationships or improper exercise of economic power. They
would, however, provide a strong motivation for inquiring into possible
alternative explanations for their existence.
Analyses of the apparent independence (or interdependence) of business
and personnel relationships between institutions and companies covered by the
cross section of nearly 11,000 non-null institution/company pairs were under-
taken by the Institutional Investor Study. Observations were grouped by
institution type and correlations were calculated between the magnitude of
institutional stockholdings or bondholdings and the presence of either a plan
manager relationship or personnel relationship between the institution and the
company. Other variables of interest important in the analyses were institution
size, company size, and geographic proximity of institution and company
headquarters.
Results of the correlations are intriguing. All correlation coefficents between
measures of business and other relationships are positive and highly significant
if the institution in question is a bank; all are nearly zero if the institution is
not a bank, but rather an investment adviser, property-liability, or life in-
surance company [40].
Regression analyses then were employed to explore the pattern of intercor-
relations among these relationships and to control for possibly spurious
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correlative sources. Examples of intercorrelations which would be considered
spurious are those which result from geographic proximity or from the respec-
tive sizes of institution and corporation. Large corporations are expected to
maintain their principal banking or other financial relationships with large
financial institutions and vice versa.
The findings reported by the SEC study go beyond such simple expecta-
tions, however. For banking histitutions only, strong intercorrelations remain
among all of stocklholdings, bondholdings, the probability of officer/director
interlocks, and the probability of institutional management of all or part of the
corporation's employee benefit plans. These correlations remain significant
even after size and regional proximity are controlled for. Should the institution
be other than a bank, by contrast, no such systematic, statistical relationship
appears to exist [41].
These findings are significant, not only statistically but also economically.
For example, the probability that a sample bank will manage an employee
benefit plan for a sample company is approximately 3.6 times greater if an
officer/director interlock exists between the bank and the corporation, than if
no such interrelationship exists [42]. The presence and magnitude of stockhold-
ings and bondholdings also increase the probability of the existence of a plan
manager relationship and/or a personnel interlock between banks and non-
financial corporations.
For a non-bank financial institution, no such systematic relationships
appear to exist among any of stockholding, bondholding, plan manager, or
personnel relationships, Statistically, one can be quite comfortable with a
hypothesis that multiple business relationships, where they exist between
corporations and non-bank financial institutions, are independent events. In
other words, the existence or size of any one such relationship does not appear
to be correlated with the existence or size of any other such relationship.
The probability that the pattern of intercorrelation among multiple business
relationship observed between banks and non-financial corporations could
result from chance when in fact the relationships are independent of one
another, is considered to be remote [43]. Banks appear to be generically
different in this respect from non-bank financial institutions.
6. A legacy of Glass-Steagall
The above review of aggregate data shows that institutional investors have
become major holders of corporate stock over the half century since Berle and
Means first wrote, and that their growth as shareholders is continuing. It also
shows that all ten of the largest stockholders are bank trust departments and
that banks in the aggregate now account for almost two-thirds of all institu-
tional stockholdings. Furthermore, institutional stock portfolios tend to be
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concentrated to a surprising degree, and the shares in which they are con-
centrated are those of the largest U.S. corporations. As a result, most of the
largest issuers have five or fewer institutional stockholders, typically banks,
which together hold significant portions of the corporation's outstanding stock
and with which the firms may have a number of other business relationship. As
discussed, the multiple business relationships between banks and corporate
clients are not statistically independent of one another and, in this respect,
banks appear to be significantly different from other types of institutional
investors. Adolf Berle's concerns in 1968, then, would appear to have a
substantial basis in fact. A number of hypotheses, of course, would be
consistent with these observations.
One such hypothesis would be that there are substantial economies of scale
in the provision of financial services and especially in the provision of banking
services. There is, of course, a substantial literature on economies of scale in
commercial banking, which is generally supportive of this conclusion [44]. Not
pursuing the argument further here does not imply that it is deemed to be
invalid, only that, being well recognized, it may be less interesting than other
hypotheses which also may have merit.
A second hypothesis, in combination with the first, perhaps, could be
described as a "Robber Barons" theory of financial concentration. Under this
hypothesis, financial institutions, especially banks, may be perceived as acquir-
ing considerable size and concentration through economies of scale or any
other means and, as a result, obtaining considerable power over client corpora-
tions. This power may be derived from a bank's creditor relationships, from its
stockholdings, or from other sources. The financial institution's abilities to
ration credit and vote shares, for example, could be used as levers to induce
client companies to avail themselves of all the institution's services, perhaps on
non-competitive terms.
Such an hypothesis would be consistent with the apparent clustering of
stockholding, loan, deposit, personnel, and plan manager relationships between
banks, trust departments, and client corporations. While not denying the
possibility that such power may, on occasion, account for some multiplication
of business relationships between banks and non-financial corporations, the
possibility that such power would be a primary determinant in the establish-
ment and continuation of such relationships over long periods of time, without
generating large numbers of lawsuits and public scandals, appears unlikely -
almost as unlikely as the probability that observed bank/company interrela-
tionships are independent events.
A third hypothesis which warrants examination is that the prohibition on
payment of interest on demand deposits, incorporated in the Banking Acts of
1933 and 1935 [45], has had the effect of "bundling" various banking services,
including trust department services, into the deposit relationship between
commerical banks and corporate customers. Given the mood of the time and
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the intent of other sections of the same legislation [46], it seems clear that such
a result was far from the minds of the legislation's sponsors [47]. Nonetheless,
direct controls on rates or prices payable by financial institutions or others in
marketplaces that are otherwise competitive operate almost invariably to direct
competitive pressures into non-price forms. Electric toasters "given away" by
savings and loan associations in exchange for deposits subject to Regulation Q
ceilings, the "soft dollars" with which Wall Street was awash while fixed
minimum brokerage commissions were maintained by the NYSE, even the
innumerable empty seats flown around the country by scheduled airlines under
Civil Aeronautics Board rate regulation, stand as testimony to the inexorable
force of competition in conflict with rate regulation.
Similarly in the banking industry, efforts through rate regulation to suppress
direct price competition for deposits have resulted in non-price forms of
competition. Commercial banks also give away toasters to new holders of
passbook savings accounts; branch banks and money dispensers crop up on
every corner as banks and thrift institutions reach out to retail customers
through "convenience", as well as through ubiquitous "free services", to attract
deposits. Of more interest here, however, corporate clients also have become
accustomed to the provision by banks of free or underpriced services in
exchange for deposits. Many of these are provided by bank trust departments.
A direct comparison of fees charged by banks and investment advisers for
essentially similar, portfolio management services gives insight into the magni-
tude of incentives for corporations to use bank trust departments rather than
investment advisers or others for employee benefit plan management, for
example. Aggregated over all classes of accounts, bank trust departments
charged management fees during 1969 which averaged 0.21% of managed
assets [48]. Investment adviser fee ratios averaged 0.46% of assets at that time
[49]. The average fee ratio for bank-managed employee benefit funds was
0.10% [50], while for investment advisers the comparable average was 0.40%
[51]. Although aggregates such as these may not be directly comparable due to
important differences in the size distribution of accounts managed by the two
institutional types, direct comparisons of fee ratios charged to clients of
employee benefit and individual accounts, stratified by account size, continue
to show bank-administered fee ratios to be consistently lower than those of
investment advisers for all but the very largest of accounts, by amounts which
vary from 8 to 32% of the investment adviser's fee [52].
Reasons for the ability of bank trust departments to be so intensely
competitive in fees charged are not difficult to find. Trust departments are
compensated for their services both directly, through management and trustee
fees, and indirectly, through their ability to benefit from direct deposits by
trust accounts in the bank, the "float" generated by account transactions and,
prior to 1970, reciprocal deposits by broker-dealers in exchange for trust
department brokerage fees [53].
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Indirect revenues from reciprocal deposits by brokers were estimated by the
SEC in 1969 to amount to roughly 10.7% of direct fees charged trust depart-
ment accounts [54]; in addition, deposits and the float were estimated to
approximate 30% of direct fee revenues [55]. Indirect revenues of such magni-
tudes, which are not available to non-bank fund managers, can easily account
for the substantial difference observed in direct fees charged by bank trust
departments and their principal non-bank competitors for portfolio manage-
ment services.
It is difficult, of course, to estimate the extent to which the success of bank
trust departments in attracting funds from alternative investment managers is
attributable to the lower fees made possible by a bank's ability to utilize the
float and deposits generated by such accounts. It is not at all unlikely,
however, that differences as large as these many have been, and may continue
to be, important to the competitive success of commercial bank trust depart-
ments. If so, it should be noted that this difference owes its existence to the
prohibition on payment of interest on demand deposits contained in the 1933
and 1935 Banking Acts and would be eliminated by their repeal. It will be
interesting to observe the impact on bank fees of the repeal of this prohibition
and the gradual deregulation of interest rates on deposits as called for by the
recently enacted Depository Institutions Deregulation and. Monetary Control
Act of 1980 [56].
7. Postscript on policy
The principal purpose of this article has not been to opine on public policy,
but rather to examine the factual bases underlying opinions often expressed by
others regarding public policy towards suspected concentrations of economic
power in big business, big financial institutions, and big banks.
The facts reviewed here suggest that suspected concentrations of power in
large non-financial corporations are real, not imagined. The public appears
even more dependent today than in years past on the economic performance of
major corporations, the largest of which account for surprisingly large fractions
of the entire corporate sector and Gross National Product. This review of
institutional investors suggests that their potential influence as stockholders
and creditors and through other relationships on the affairs of large non-finan-
cial corporations also is substantial and growing. The analysis herein has
demonstrated that large banks and associated trust departments may be
particularly influential due to their large size, the concentration of their
stockholdings, the number of their other business relationships with portfolio
companies, and the tendency for those relationships to be focused on the same
client corporations.
A distinction should be drawn, of course, between the ability of individual
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banks or other financial institutions to influence individual non-financial
corporations and the ability of a small nucleus of such financial institutions to
influence many large corporations. Only the former would appear to follow
from the analyses reviewed above.
Adolf Berle, armed with far fewer facts than those now available to us,
concluded a decade ago that the alarming power of institutional investors, and
especially large bank trust departments, justified legislation to prohibit banks
or bank holding companies from engaging in non-banking businesses [57].
Representatives of the securities industry and competing financial institutions,
such as insurance companies or investment advisers, likely would support
Berle's conclusion [581.
An hypothesis developed in the preceding section of this article is that much
of the controversy over Glass-Steagall may be focused on the wrong sections
of that legislation, i.e. those sections which prohibit banks from engaging in
securities activities. Arguably, the time may have come for outright repeal of
those (different) sections of the 1933 and 1935 Banking Acts which regulate
rates paid by banks for funds, independently of any action to repeal, weaken
or strengthen direct prohibitions on bank securities activities.
Whether actions as severe as divestiture or direct prohibitions on certain
activities are justified depends on one's assessment of both the severity of the
problem and the efficiency costs incident to the proposed solution. To the
extent that some portion of competitive success by banks in trust department
or other activities is derived from efficiency rather than from other sources,
direct prohibitions would deprive customers and the economy in general of the
benefits of that efficiency. Absent compelling evidence that banks not only
possess but also have used economic power inappropriately, one may be
hesitant to incur such costs.
By the same token, in light of present findings, it would be reasonable for
policy-makers to be reluctant to devise new public policies or support the
continuation of old policies which encourage or contribute to the bundling of
trust department or other services into the deposit relationship and, hence,
provide banks wholly artificial competitive advantages over other financial
institutions in the provision of financial services, including the management of
securities portfolios. Restrictions on interest payments to depositors clearly
provide such an artificial incentive and, given the absence of credible evidence
that any positive benefits ever have been derived therefrom, should be high on
a list of candidates for deregulation.
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